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Child abuse is a horror that our society condemns but our legal system perpet-
uates. Although there is much talk about protecting children, our legal system is
far more concerned about protecting parents' rights. Indeed they should be con-
sidered as sacred, but at what cost?'
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of childhood, for most of us, conjures memories of
the warm, safe feeling of "home." It was a time when few cares
could penetrate the safety and security created by familial love. For
many children, however, violent injuries, inflicted by supposed loved
ones, disrupt these formative years. Often, these injuries result in
permanent disabilities or, shockingly, death.
Consequently, state and/or local governments routinely inves-
tigate suspected occurrences of child abuse. In appropriate cases, a
court order can either limit or terminate parental rights to the cus-
tody of minor children. 2 The courts, however, use these measures
cautiously. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals requires the state to produce "clear, cogent and convincing
proof" when seeking a court order to limit or terminate parental
rights.3
Many scholars criticize this increased burden of proof as an over-
protection of the parents at the expense of the child. 4 The courts
typically justify these precautions by emphasizing the importance of
maintaining paramount parental rights.5 Even though judicial atti-
1. Dorros & Dorsey, Whose Rights Are We Protecting Anyway?, CHILDREN TODAY, May-
June 1989, at 6, 7.
2. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Locke, 162 W. Va. 946, 948, 253 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1979)
(upholding the constitutionality of a statute permitting the removal of a child from his home for up
to 10 days where there exists both an imminent danger to the child and no reasonable alternatives
to removal).
3. In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 245, 207 S.E.2d 129, 140 (1974), superseded by statute on
other grounds, State v. Carl. B., 301 S.E.2d 864, 868 (W. Va. 1983). See also Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (holding that the state must prove grounds
for the termination of parental rights, at a minimum, by clear and convincing evidence).
4. E.g., Horowitz, Tighten Standards for Termination of Parental Rights, CHUDREN TODAY,
May-June 1989, at 9, 10.
5. The West Virginia Supreme Court emphasized the importance of parental rights as follows:
In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly established than
that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount
to that of any other person. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the
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tudes impede state efforts to intervene on behalf of abused children,
the state should still attempt to protect a threatened child from abu-
sive parents, especially when the state knows that the child is in
imminent physical danger.
This note examines the constitutional rights of children injured
by domestic abuse and the potential liability of state officials where
the state had knowledge of the impending abuse and failed to act. 6
The discussion will proceed through three separate stages. First, this
note will analyze relevant constitutional developments in the areas
of a child's fourteenth amendment due process rights and state in-
action through 1988. 7 Second, it will present a detailed study of the
recent landmark United States Supreme Court decision addressing
this issue, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services.8 Finally, after examining cases decided after DeShaney, this
note will consider the direction of future interpretation of a child's
due process rights as affected by a state's failure to act.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW: A CHILD's CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THE SECTION 1983 CLAIM
BASED ON STATE INACTION BEFORE DESHANEY
A. A Child's Constitutional Rights
Children basically enjoy the same constitutional protections and
liberties as adults.9 However, judicial interpretation of these rights
right to raise one's children is a fundamental personal liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... [T]he West Virginia Constitution in equal meas-
ure protects this fundamental right of parenthood.
Willis, 157 W. Va. at 237, 207 S.E.2d at 136-37 (citation omitted), noted in In re Betty J. W., 371
S.E.2d 326, 327 (,V. Va. 1988).
6. The party being sued will generically be referred to as the "state," even though a variety
of state controlled entities and employees may be named as defendants. See Comment, Actionable
Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1048 & n.2 (1986) (recognizing,
however, that the state itself cannot be liable for damages under section 1983 because of the eleventh
amendment).
7. The abuse of children potentially affects both the substantive and procedural aspects of
the due process clause. Hereinafter, any mention of "due process," absent a specific label, refers to
either the substantive or the procedural component.
8. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
9. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967) (holding that basic constitutional rights
enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juvenile defendants).
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differ between minority and adulthood.10 A child's constitutional
rights may be either expanded or restricted according to a state's
"parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of
the child."" The state acts as parens patriae "when parental control
falters" because "[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have
the capacity to take care of themselves. '1 2
Illustrating the states' parens patriae interest in the health and
welfare of children, the Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R. 13 rec-
ognized that "some parents 'may at times be acting against the in-
terests of their children,' " despite stating that "parents generally
do act in the child's best interest.' ' 4 In Parham, both the majority5
and the dissent 16 noted that parents do not have an absolute right
to determine the destiny of their minor children because a state may
override a parental decision when the physical or mental health of
a child is jeopardized. Also, a state's parens patriae interest has
prompted the Supreme Court to sustain state efforts to limit a child's
liberties which could expose them to corruptive or improper influ-
ences .17
The Supreme Court has applied the states' general interest as
parens patriae for minor children in several specific contexts. How-
ever, prior to DeShaney, the Court had not addressed whether this
10. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) ("[T]he Constitution does not mandate
elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.").
11. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). See also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,
536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning it [sic]
uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty toward children.").
12. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
13. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
14. Id. at 602 (quoting Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1979)).
15. "[W]e have recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental dis-
cretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized." Id. at 603.
16. "Notions of parental authority and family autonomy cannot stand as absolute and invariable
barriers to the assertion of constitutional rights by children." Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (1989) (upholding city ordinance
limiting the use of dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18 as non-violative of first
amendment associational rights); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (upholding statute
prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors under 17 years of age as non-invasive of children's
freedom of expression or other constitutionally guaranteed freedoms).
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interest is strong enough to require the state to protect potentially
abused children. Under these circumstances, "parental control" has
clearly "faltered" and "the State must play its part as parens pa-
triae." 1 8 Does a state's role as parens patriae merely permit, or more
significantly, require protection of abused children?
B. The Section 1983 Claim Based on State Inaction
An abused child who alleges a violation of a constitutional right
by a state's failure to act typically seeks redress under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.19 To come within the meaning of
section 1983, the child usually claims that the state, as parens pa-
triae, failed to protect the child from a parent's physical abuse,
thereby causing a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." ' 20 To establish a section 1983 claim based on
a state's failure to protect a citizen, the plaintiff must satisfy two
requirements. 2' The plaintiff must show that the failure to act re-
sulted in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, 22 and
that the official responsible to act showed "deliberate indifference"
to the plaintiff's situation. 23
18. Schall, 476 U.S. at 265.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The statute states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,.
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (the due process clause), applied in, e.g., Milburn v. Anne
Arundel County Dep't of Social Services, 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d
185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
21. E.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337
(1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 141 (1981).
22. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)). Accord Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
23. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794 (citing Turpin v. Mallet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980) cert. denied
sub nora. Turpin v. West Haven, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980)).
Abuses of government power, evaluated through "a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit
of science, . . . a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, . . . the detached consideration
of conflicting claims, . . . [and] a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling
the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society," must "shock the conscience"
to result in a deprivation of substantive due process. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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1. State Inaction as a Violation of Constitutionally Protected
Rights
As stated above, plaintiffs typically allege a violation of the abused
child's fourteenth amendment due process rights in a section 1983
action based upon a state's failure to act. Several federal cases,
decided prior to DeShaney, and discussed below, significantly con-
tributed to the development of judicial attitudes toward alleged viol-
ations of fourteenth amendment liberties through a state's failure
to offer protection.
a. Protection as a General Due Process Right
Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for state action which
deprives an individual of a constitutional right. 24 Many courts have
attempted to identify situations where the state may be held liable
for failing to prevent the deprivation of a constitutional right. 21 When
a court does identify one of these situations, the imposition of li-
ability for state inaction effectively places an affirmative duty of
protection on the state. 26 The decisions discussed below illustrate the
federal courts' resistance to arguments for a general due process
right to protection. Before DeShaney, the Seventh Circuit consis-
tently refused to accept protection as a due process right.27 Other
federal circuits adopted the Seventh Circuit view. 28
During this period, the Supreme Court remained silent on the
specific issue of liability for injuries to private individuals arising
from state inaction. Nonetheless, in three significant opinions, the
Court limited the scope of state liability, thereby hampering a section
1983 claimant's ability to prevail in an action based on a state's
failure to offer protection.
24. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1048.
26. Id.
27. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
28. See, e.g., Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (Ist Cir. 1986); Bradberry
v. Pinellas County, 789 F.2d 1513 (lth Cir. 1986); Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d
1478, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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In upholding a statute granting the state immunity from torts
committed by paroled or released prisoners, 29 the Court, in Martinez
v. California,30 did not address the issue of state inaction. Instead,
the Court chose to decide the case on causation principles, avoiding
the question of whether the plaintiff had been deprived of her con-
stitutional rights. 31 Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the
section 1983 action against the state, initiated on behalf of a girl
who had been murdered by a parolee, because neither the life32 nor
the property33 of a decedent is deprived where the death is "too
remote a consequence" of the related state action.
34
.In Daniels v. Williams,35 the Supreme Court considered the men-
tal state required for a violation of the due process clause. Previ-
ously, in Parratt v. Taylor,36 the Court held that loss of property
due to a negligent act by the state could amount to deprivation under
the fourteenth amendment. 37 In Daniels, however, a unanimous Court
overruled this portion of Parratt, holding that a negligent act causing
unintended loss of life, liberty, or property does not violate the due
process clause.38 Even though the Court did not expressly address
29. Cal. GOV'T CODE § 845.8(a) (West Supp. 1979) provides as follows: "Neither a public entity
nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or
release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from
determining whether to revoke his parole or release."
30. 444 U.S. 277 (1980), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
31. Id. at 284-85.
32. The court reasoned as follows:
A legislative decision that has an incremental impact on the probability that death will result
in any given situation-such as setting the speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour instead of 45-
cannot be characterized as state action depriving a person of life just because it may set
in motion a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random death of an innocent
bystander.
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 281.
33. The court addressed 'property' as follows:
[T]he cause of action for wrongful death that the State has created is a species of 'property'
protected by the Due Process Clause. On [this] hypothesis, the immunity statute could be
viewed as depriving the plaintiffs of that property interest insofar as they seek to assert a
claim against parole officials.
Id. at 281-82.
34. Id. at 285.
35. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
36. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
37. Id. at 536-37.
38. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
19891
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state inaction, its ruling apparently established a state of mind re-
quirement for all violations of the due process clause. 9 Therefore,
because negligent state actions cannot constitute a deprivation of
fourteenth amendment rights, negligent inaction would also fail to
support a section of 1983 claim.
Davidson v. Cannon,40 a companion case to Daniels, confirmed
this implication. In Davidson, the Court, specifically dealing with
state inaction, held that a prison official's lack of due care in failing
to protect a prison inmate from another prisoner does not violate
the due process clause. 4' However, unlike the unanimous ruling in
Daniels, three justices dissented from the Davidson majority. Justice
Brennan, believing that reckless official conduct causing injury con-
stitutes a due process violation, stated that the record indicated a
reckless, and not merely negligent, failure to act. 42 Justice Blackmun
went a step further, suggesting that even negligent state action can
deprive a prison inmate of constitutionally protected liberties .4 As
this note will discuss more fully in later sections, Justice Blackmun's
dissent explained that "once the State has taken away an inmate's
means of protecting himself ... , a prison official's negligence in
providing protection can amount to a deprivation of the inmate's
liberty . . .,44
Therefore, prior to DeShaney, the Supreme Court, without spe-
cifically ruling on protection as a general due process right, none-
theless had gradually excluded sources of state liability under section
1983. However, as mentioned above, several of the federal circuits,
led by the Seventh Circuit, expressly refused to classify protection
as a constitutional right.
For example, in Bowers v. Devito,45 the Seventh Circuit dismissed
a section 1983 claim brought on behalf of a woman who had been
39. See id. at 335-36.
40. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
41. Id. at 348 ("The guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the
State must guarantee due care on the part of its officials.").
42. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 354-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. Bowers, 686 F.2d 616.
[Vol. 92
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killed by a known schizophrenic. 46 A state court had previously found
the assailant not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, committed
to a state mental health center, and subsequently released from the
facility.47 The complaint alleged both that the state knew the mur-
derer was dangerous when he was released and that the state acted
ecklessly in releasing him. 48 Judge Posner, writing for the majority,
held that the state had no duty to protect the decedent, stating that
"[t]he Consiitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state
to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or
the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as main-
taining law and order."' 49
Also, in the Seventh Circuit's DeShaney° opinion, Judge Posner
reaffirmed the Seventh Circuit's belief the state's failure to protect
citizens from private violence does not deprive them of any con-
stitutional rights.-" Distinguishing the section 1983 claim from tra-
ditional notions of tort liability, the court again concluded that a
constitutional tort requires deprivation by the state through action,
not inaction. 2
Furthermore, in Archie v. City of Racine,5 3 the Seventh Circuit
dismissed a section 1983 claim arising out of a fire department dis-
patcher's failure to provide requested rescue services for a woman
who subsequently died. Extending Daniels v. Davidson, the court
held that aggravated forms of negligence do not violate the due
process clause.5 4 More importantly, the court again rejected the ex-
46. Id. at 617.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 618.
50. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
51. Id. at 301 (citing Waker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 1986); Ellsworth v. City of
Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984);
Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 898-900 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); Jackson
v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Bowers,
686 F.2d at 618).
The court assumed, arguendo, that the state's failure to act was a sufficiently aggravated form
of negligence to preclude the application of Daniels, 474 U.S. 327, and Davidson, 474 U.S. 344.
52. See DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 302.
53. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
54. See id. at 1219-20.
1989]
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istence of an affirmative state duty to "protect its residents from
private predators or their own misfortunes," stating that this rule
"is an implication of the language and the structure of the Due
Process Clause." 55
Therefore, as a general proposition, the federal court system de-
clined to recognize general protection from the actions of private
individuals as an affirmative state duty under the Constitution.
However, despite considerable disagreement as to its proper appli-
cation, a significant exception to this rule does exist.
b. The Right to Safety
The right to safety, dating back to the writings of Blackstone,
Coke, and Hobbes 5 6 "has deep roots in American legal and phil-
osophical thought. ' 57 Nonetheless, prior to DeShaney, acceptance
of the right to safety as a constitutional maxim developed "quite
slowly" and "lack[ed] clear standards defining its scope." 58 How-
ever, as an exception to the federal courts' general reluctance to
require the state to provide affirmative protective services to private
individuals, most courts recognized the right to safety where the state
either acted to limit a citizen's ability to provide self-protection or
previously intervened to assist the threatened individual.
Due to the state created limitations on an individual's ability to
protect himself, judicial acceptance of the right to safety grew out
of the eighth amendment, which prohibits the infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishments" by the state.59 For example, in Estelle v.
55. Id. at 1221.
56. See Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children
from Abuse and Neglect, 23 H~Auv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 218 (1988). "In Leviathan, Hobbes
asserted that government's primary purpose and responsibility is protection." Id. Coke, in Calvin's
Case, stated that, in the social compact, the citizen provides "true and faithful lineage" and the
government "undertakes the duty of protection." Id. (citation omitted) (citing [1608] 4 Co. Rep. 1
(K.B.)). Also, Blackstone defined the right to personal security as the "primary right each citizen
possesses" which "consists in ... uninterrupted enjoyment of ... life ... limbs ... body ...
health, and ... reputation." Id. (citations omitted) (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMiENTARIs 129).
57. Id. at 218.
58. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Gamble,6 0 the Supreme Court, after stating that the eighth amend-
ment prohibits more than "physically barbarious punishment," 61 held
that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' prohib-
ited by the Eighth Amendment. ' 62 Under these circumstances, the
state's failure to act violates a constitutional right, thereby creating
the basis for a section 1983 cause of action. 63
Because the eighth amendment applies only to penal institu-
tions,64 federal courts extended this application of the right to safety
beyond prison walls by including it within the fourteenth amendment
notions of life, liberty, and property.65 Consequently, involuntary,
non-penal confinement entitles individuals to living conditions bear-
ing some relationship to the purpose of their confinement. 6
In Youngberg v. Romero,67 the Supreme Court applied the right
to safety to involuntarily confined mentally retarded persons. While
institutionalized, the plaintiff in Youngberg suffered numerous in-
juries "both by his own violence and by the reactions of other [pa-
tients] to him.' '68 In his section 1983 action, the plaintiff primarily
sought compensation for the state's failure to protect him from these
injuries.6 9 The Court, vacating and remanding the Third Circuit's
60. 429 U.S. 97 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
61. Id. at 102 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
The eighth amendment also "embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized stan-
dards, humanity, and decency . . .,' against which we must evaluate penal measures." Id. at 102
(citation omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
62. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83).
63. See id. at 105.
64. Mushlin, supra note 58, at 222 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)).
65. See id. at 222-23.
66. For example, "[i]f, as in the case of the mentally ill, confinement is to treat and protect,
the deprivation of liberty lacks constitutional support when it fails to advance those purposes." Id.
at 223 (citing Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S.
1 (1980)).
67. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
68. Id. at 310.
69. Id. at 311. The amended complaint also sought damages for the state's failure to provide
appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." Id.
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decision, 70 nonetheless held that the patient "enjoys constitutionally
protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, rea-
sonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. ' 71 Also, because of the inherent
punitive nature of penal institutions, the Court made the scope of
the right to safety contained in the fourteenth amendment consid-
erably broader than the right to safety arising from the eighth
amendment. 72
Continuing this trend, many courts extended the boundaries of
the right to safety beyond institutional walls. 73 Even the Seventh
Circuit, known for its consistent denial of an affirmative due process
right to protection, admitted that the fourteenth amendment requires
affirmative state action where the state had placed an individual in
a position of danger. 74 Ultimately, however, the court in Bowers
refused to find that the state had sufficiently endangered an indi-
vidual who was murdered by a former mental hospital patient where
the state had reason to know that the former patient was danger-
ous.
75
As mentioned above, the federal courts also recognized the right
to safety where the state had previously offered assistance to a
threatened citizen. For example, in child abuse cases, prior actions
taken by the state (such as the temporary removal of the abused
70. The Third Circuit held that the fourteenth amendment requires that the involuntarily com-
mitted retain liberty interests in both freedom of movement and personal security. Id. at 311 (citing
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (1980)).
71. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 324.
72. See id. at 321-22 ("Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions are designed to
punish.").
73. See Mushlin, supra note 58, at 226.
74. Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). After echoing the Seventh Circuit's
position that "[t]he Constitution is a charter of negative liberties" that "does not require the federal
government or the state to provide services," the court stated that where "the state puts a man in
a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, ... it is as much an active
tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit." Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. The court reasoned as follows:
[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by
criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such
predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or,
we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.
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child from the home) could give rise to a "special relationship"
between the state and the child. Courts uniformly accepted the pos-
sibility that the state, by establishing a "special relationship" with
an individual, may be liable under section 1983 for failing to act
in later situations. 76
In Jensen v. Conrad,77 the Fourth Circuit sought to establish a
method of determining whether a "special relationship" is created
under a given set of facts. 78 As a result, the court developed the
following factors to determine whether a "special relationship" ex-
its:
1) Whether the victim or the perpetrator was in legal custody at the time of the
incident, or had been in legal custody prior to the incident ....
2) Whether the [S]tate has expressly stated its desire to provide affirmative pro-
tection to a particular class of specific individuals . . . . [and]
3) Whether the State knew of the claimant's plight n9
Even though the above factors were not necessary to the court's
final decision in the case, the court's thorough treatment of the
"special relationship" doctrine represented a strong statement of the
Fourth Circuit's intended direction if again faced with such facts. 0
Despite the Fourth Circuit's desire to establish parameters of the
"special relationship" doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit, in Jones v.
Phyfer,8' refused, with both little discussion and no mention of any
standards for evaluation, to find the existence of a "special rela-
tionship" between the state and an individual who had been raped
by a furloughed juvenile six months after the youth had been con-
victed and imprisoned for breaking and entering the victim's home. 82
76. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1051.
77. 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1984).
78. Id. at 194 (dicta) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), for the general
proposition that "governmental officials will not be held liable if the law at the time of the alleged
wrongdoing was not 'clearly established.' ").
79. Id.
80, See id. at 195 ("Were the issue properly before this court on different facts, there would
be ... a ruling that the facts of [the] case fell within the meaning of 'special relationship.' ").
81. 761 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 646 (The crime and the subsequent conviction were "not sufficient to establish the
required special relationship that would impose a duty on the state to protect plaintiff or to warn
her of [his] release.").
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However, in Estate of Bailey v. County of York,83 the Third
Circuit did offer partial guidance for determining whether a "special
relationship" is created. In Estate of Bailey, the court considered
the special relationship issue when the state removed an abused child
from her mother's custody and subsequently returned the child with-
out an adequate investigation.84 The child later died as a result of
abuse inflicted by her mother's boyfriend, resulting in the filing of
a section 1983 action by the child's estate against several state entities
and officials. In its decision, the court emphasized the differences
between dangers to the public at large85 and "special dangers" to
specific individuals.8 6 While it declined the opportunity to define the
"special relationship, ' 87 the court did provide some insight stating
that "[w]hen the [state] knows that a child has been beaten, '[t]his
strengthens the argument that some sort of special relationship has
been established." '88
The three opinions discussed above demonstrate the federal ap-
pellate courts' general reluctance, prior to DeShaney, to establish
binding parameters or standards for determining whether a "special
relationship" had been created.89 In most cases, the courts primarily
decided the "special relationship" issue on the facts, with little an-
alytical explanation.90 Also, many courts declined to recognize a
"special relationship" requiring affirmative state action "merely be-
cause the state has chosen to provide basic services to its citizens." 9'
83. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 768 F.2d 1353 (1985).
84. Id. at 505.
85. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920
(1980) (holding that the murder by the parolee of a member of the public at large after he was released
from prison was "too remote a consequence" to result in a finding of state liability under section
1983).
86. Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510-11 (refusing to hold, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs
will not be able to prove the "necessary causal nexus" between the state's inaction and the resulting
injuries).
87. Id. at 511.
88. Id. (quoting Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194 n.1l).
89. Note that while the Fourth Circuit, in Jensen, did articulate non-binding factors for "special
relationship" analysis, the court declined to create a "comprehensive definition" of the term. Jensen,
747 F.2d at 194 n.11 (dicta).
90. See, e.g., Phyfer, 761 F.2d at 646; Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511.
91. Comment, supra note 6, at 1055 (citing, for example, Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511;
Beard, 728 F.2d at 900; Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983); Jackson,
715 F.2d at 1203-06; Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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Nonetheless, after Youngberg, the lower federal courts began to
apply the right to safety beyond both prisons and institutions. 92
Through either a direct assertion of the right to safety93 or an implicit
application of this right by way of the "special relationship" doc-
trine, 94 many courts recognized some form of a right to personal
security for persons not in state custody. 95 However, prior to
DeShaney, the issue of state protection as a due process right was
"not free from doubt" and the scope of this right was "by no means
clear." 96
Even though the Seventh Circuit recognized the "special rela-
tionship" doctrine, 97 it strengthened its hostility toward the existence
of protection as a due process right by consistently finding that such
relationship had not been established. In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Services,98 the Seventh Circuit expressly re-
jected the standards offered by both Estate of Bailey99 and Jensen.00
Therefore, one of the Supreme Court's major tasks in evaluating
DeShaney would be the resolution of this split of authority between
the Seventh Circuit and the Third and Fourth Circuits. Because the
Supreme Court represents the sole source of unification for dis-
crepancies in the federal courts, its decision in DeShaney would su-
persede these differing precedents and establish binding law for the
entire federal court system.
2. "Deliberate Indifference"
In addition to establishing that the state's failure to act led to
the deprivation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff in a section
92. See Mushlin, supra note 56, at 226.
93. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-95 (11th Cir. 1987).
94. See, e.g., Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.
95. See Mushlin, supra note 56, at 226-27. See also Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797 ("[A] child in-
voluntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation analogous to a prisoner in a penal institution
and a child confined in a mental health facility ... may bring a section 1983 action for violation of
fourteenth amendment rights.").
96. See Mushlin, supra note 56 at 227 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Services, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 749 U.S. 882 (1986); Bradberry v. Pinnellas County, 789 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1986);
Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1265 (1986)).
97. See Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.
98. 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987) (the court of appeals decision preceding the Supreme Court's
review of the case).
99. 768 F.2d 503.
100. 747 F.2d 185.
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1983 action must also prove that the official responsible to act showed
"deliberate indifference" to the situation.'0" Where no violation of
a constitutionally protected liberty occurs, this issue becomes moot.
Therefore, in the context of state inaction, the only discussions of
deliberate indifference appear in decisions initially holding that the
failure to act was unconstitutional. For example, in Estelle v. Gam-
ble,102 the Supreme Court, after finding that the Constitution re-
quires the state to provide basic medical services to prison inmates,
held that a prison official's denial of medical care to inmates con-
stitutes deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs.103
As a parallel to the difficulty of expanding the right to safety
beyond institutional walls, the Second Circuit, in Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Social Services,14 tackled the "unusually troublesome
task" of determining whether deliberate indifference could be proven
outside of a penal institution and in the foster care setting. 05 Despite
the presence of a statute requiring reports of abuse, 06 the court
101. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794 (citing Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.) (Turpin III), cert.
denied, sub nom. Turpin v. West Haven, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980)).
102. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
103. Id. The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards
of decency in modem legislation codifying the common-law view that "[i]t is but just that the public
be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care
for himself." Id. at 103-04 (citation omitted) (quoting Spicer v. Williams, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132
S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
104. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
105. Id. at 141-42. The court stated as follows:
There is a closer and firmer line of authority running from superiors and subordinates
within an institution than exists in the foster care context .... Institutional administrators
can readily call in subordinates for consultation. They can give strict orders with reasonable
assurance that their mandates will be followed, and as added insurance other employees
stationed in proximity of the subordinates to whom orders are directed may be instructed
to monitor compliance.
By contrast, [a foster care agency] ha[s] to rely upon occasional visits for its infor-
mation gathering, and its relationship to the foster family [is] less ... hierarchial than is
the case with prison guards and a warden.
106. New York Social Services Law § 413 (McKinney 1983) states in pertinent part:
The following persons and officials are required to report or cause a report to be made in
accordance with this title when they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child coming
before them in their professional capacity is an abused or maltreated child: any ... day
care center worker or other child care or foster care worker .... Whether such person is
required to report under this title ... he shall immediately notify the person in charge of
such institution, school, facility, or agency ....
[Vol. 92
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acknowledged that "deliberate indifference ought not to be inferred
from a failure to act as readily as might be done in the prison
context, since ... there are obvious alternative explanations for a
family being given the benefit of the doubt and the agency refusing
to intervene."107 Consequently, the court held that gross negligence
on the part of a foster care agency in failing to report the suspected
abuse of a foster child only "creates a strong presumption of de-
liberate indifference."' 108 However, the court also stated that "[t]he
more a statute or regulation clearly mandates a specific course of
conduct, the more it furnishes a plausible basis for inferring delib-
erate indifference from a failure to act, even without any specific
knowledge of harm or risk."''0 9 Therefore, given both the agency's
lackadaisical investigation of suspected abuse" and the existence of
a statutory reporting provision, the court concluded that a finding
of deliberate indifference could be made outside of the more struc-
tured institutional hierarchy.
In Taylor v. Ledbetter,' the Eleventh Circuit, under similar facts,
agreed with the Second Circuit's analysis in Doe v. New York City
Dep't of Social Services. The court again expressed concern over
the foster child's ability to show deliberate indifference in a non-
institutional setting," 2 specifically referring to the problems of prov-
ing "actual knowledge of abuse or that agency personnel deliberately
failed to learn what was occurring in the foster home.""' 3 None-
theless, the court held that deliberate indifference amounting tb a
violation of fourteenth amendment rights" 4 can be found in the fos-
107. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d at 142.
108. Id. at 143. "While this presumption is at least theoretically rebuttable, the fact that there
can be instances where glaring negligence may not constitute deliberate indifference does not mean
that a fact finder is barred from equating negligence of a certain dimension with deliberate indif-
ference." Id.
109. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
110. See § II.A.l, infra.
111. 818 F.2d 791 (l1th Cir. 1987).
112. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796 ("The lack of proximity in the foster home situation simply suggests
that deliberate indifference is not as easily inferred or shown from a failure to act.").
113. Id.
114. The court, after discussing such constitutional issues as the "liberty interest" (right to safety)
and the "special relationship," did not attribute its finding to any one doctrine; instead, the decision
seemed to base its holding on a general consideration of fourteenth amendment liberties.
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ter care setting. 115
While the question of deliberate indifference had only been ad-
dressed in several limited circumstances, federal courts extended this
issue beyond the institutional setting to the field of foster care. How-
ever, unlike the right to safety, which also evolved out of the prison
context, there was much less confusion and debate over the appli-
cation and definition of deliberate indifference before the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney.
Summarizing the federal courts' attitudes toward section 1983
claims arising out of the state's failure to protect a private citizen,
it becomes apparent that, before the Supreme Court issued its land-
mark decision in DeShaney, the definition and parameters of both
the "special relationship" doctrine and the right to safety signifi-
cantly lacked clarity and uniformity. Did the recent extensions of
the right to safety fall within the scope of the Constitution, and
would this expansion, if constitutional, continue into the area of
child abuse inflicted by either foster parents or natural parents?
III. DESHANEY V. WNNEBAGO COUNTY DEP'T OF SOCIAL
SERVICES.
A. Background
"The facts of this case are undeniably tragic.""H6 In January of
1982, Randy DeShaney's second wife, at the time of their divorce,
informed the police that Mr. DeShaney previously abused his young
son Joshua.117 The Winnebago County Department of Social Services
(hereinafter "DSS") subsequently investigated these accusations.
However, after Mr. DeShaney denied abusing his son, the DSS did
not pursue the matter. 1 8
115. Note, however, that Georgia implements a comprehensive statutory foster care and place-
ment scheme which requires "the duty to protect," regular foster home inspections, and "through
visits . . . made as frequently as necessary for the best interest of the child." Taylor, 818 F.2d. at
799 (emphasis and citation omitted) (citing GA. Comp. R. & REGS. r. 290-2-12-08).
116. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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In early 1983, Randy DeShaney's girlfriend brought Joshua, cov-
ered with bruises and abrasions, to a local hospital. 119 She claimed
that the injuries were inflicted by another child, but the hospital
personnel suspected child abuse. 120 The DSS, upon notification, im-
mediately sought and obtained, pursuant to Wisconsin statutory
law, t21 a court order placing Joshua in the temporary custody of
the hospital. 22 Three days later, an ad hoc "Child Protection Team"
decided that there was insufficient evidence of child abuse to retain
Joshua in the court's custody. 2 1
Although the team decided to release Joshua, it did recommend
that (1) Joshua should be enrolled in a preschool program, (2) Mr.
DeShaney should receive counseling from the DSS, and (3) Mr.
DeShaney's girlfriend should move out of his house, because he had
suggested that she might have been abusing Joshua. 24 Both the DSS
and Mr. DeShaney voluntarily consented to these terms in a written
agreement. 25 Three weeks later, the court dismissed the child pro-
tection case. 126
One month later, the DSS caseworker learned that Joshua had
once again been treated for "suspicious injuries"; however, the case-
worker concluded that there was "no basis for action."' 27 Over the
next six months, the same caseworker visited the DeShaney home
on a monthly basis; she consistently noticed "a number of suspicious
injuries," including head wounds, a scratched cornea, and a scraped
chin (which looked like a cigarette burn). 28 During this time, Mr.
DeShaney's girlfriend had not moved out of the house and Joshua
had not been enrolled in preschool. 29 The caseworker recorded these
119. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 299.
120. Id.
121. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.13(3), 48.19, 48.207 (West 1987).
122. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300. See also DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001.
123. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300. Prolonged custody is "authorized by Wisconsin law if 'probable
cause exists to believe that if the child is not held he or she will ... be subject to injury by
others. . . .' " Id. (citation omitted (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.205(1)(a) (West 1987)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001.
128. DeShaney, 818 F.2d at 300.
129. Id.
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incidents, along with her continuous suspicions that Joshua was be-
ing abused, "but did nothing more. '130
In November, the local hospital treated Joshua for multiple
bruises and lacerations.13 ' Hospital personnel informed the DSS that
they believed Joshua was being abused; however, "there was no
reaction from [the DSS]."132 When the caseworker next attempted
to visit JOshua, Mr. DeShaney told her that she could not see Joshua
because he was ill. 33 Finally, on March 7, she returned to the house
after being told, several days earlier, that Joshua had fainted for
no apparent reason. 134 This time, she did not even ask to see the
child. 135
What followed appears as presented in the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision:
The next day Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that he critically injured
Joshua's brain. The neurosurgeon who treated Joshua found evidence of previous
traumatic injury to the head, and Joshua's body was covered with bruises and
lesions of different vintages. Joshua's mother was summoned from Wyoming.
When she arrived [the caseworker] told her, 'I just knew the phone would ring
some day and Joshua would be dead.' He was not dead, but half his brain had
been destroyed. He is confined to an institution for the profoundly retarded, and
will remain institutionalized for the rest of his life.",'
Joshua and his mother subsequently brought a section 1983 action
against the county, the DSS, the caseworker, and her supervisor,
alleging that these state actors deprived Joshua of his liberty without
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. 37 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed
the suit on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 13
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 3 9 holding that
although Joshua had been deprived of liberty within the meaning
130. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001.
131, Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300 (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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of the due process clause, the state did not share responsibility for
the deprivation. 140 As discussed above, the court specifically rejected
the Third Circuit's position in Estate of Bailey v. County of York,141
and the Fourth Circuit's dicta in Jensen v. Conrad,142 both of which
advocated the imposition of an affirmative duty on the state to
protect a child through the creation of a "special relationship.' '1 43
The court stressed that "a constitutional tort requires deprivation
by the defendant, and not merely a failure to protect the plaintiff
from a danger created by others."' 144
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari,
[b]ecause of the inconsistent approaches taken by the lower courts in determining
when, if ever, the failure of a state or local governmental entity or its agents to
provide an individual with adequate protective services constitutes a violation of
the individual's due process rights . . . and the importance of the issue to the
administration of state and local governments
B. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six to three majority,
quickly dismissed any notion that the due process clause, in and of
itself, requires the state to protect citizens against private actors.1 46
"Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure
that the State protected them from each other." 47 The Chief Justice
then emphasized that the Due Process Clause does not generally
confer affirmative rights to governmental assistance, "even where
140. Id. at 301.
141. 768 F.2d 503 (3rd Cir. 1985).
142. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
143. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303-04.
144. Id. at 302 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920
(1980) for the assertion that "state inaction which might be deemed a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury under evolving common law notions is not enough to establish a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
145. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002 (citation omitted) (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1220-23 (7th Cir. 1988)).
146. Id. The Due Process Clause "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty,
or property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other
means." Id. at 1003.
147. Id.
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such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests
of which the government itself may not deprive the individual. 1' 48
Therefore, "[a]s a general matter," the majority concluded that state
inaction "simply" does not result in a deprivation of an individual's
due process rights where the individual is confronted with private
violence. 149
Chief Justice Rehnquist flatly rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that an affirmative state duty to act arose through the creation of
a "special relationship" between the state and Joshua, 50 and, in
doing so, apparently rejected the entire concept of "special rela-
tionships. '15' He acknowledged the imposition of an affirmative duty
of care and protection on the state in "certain limited circum-
stances" only. 52 To illustrate this point, the Chief Justice discussed
the right to safety in the institutional setting.'53 He then stressed the
narrow scope of this duty, stating that these cases "stand only for
the proposition that when the State takes a person into custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it
a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being.' ' 54 The Chief Justice concluded, then, that
the state's act of restraining an individual's freedom to act on his
own behalf constitutes a "deprivation of liberty" which requires the
state to provide protection for the individual.151
148. Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (no obligation to fund abortions
or other medical services); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no obligation to provide adequate
housing)).
149. Id.
150. The plaintiff argued that a "special relationship" was created by the state taking temporary
custody of Joshua, placing a duty on the state to continue its protection of the child in a "reasonably
competent fashion." The state's failure to discharge this duty constituted an abuse of power that
"shocks the conscience," resulting in a violation of Joshua's due process rights. Id. (citing Brief for
Petitioners 20).
151. See id. at 1004 n.4.
152. Id. at 1004-05.
153. Id. (discussing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (the state must provide adequate
medical care to prisoners); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (the state must provide in-
voluntarily committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure their "reasonable safety" from
themselves and others)).
154. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's
knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from
the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." Id.
155. Id.
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This duty, in the majority's opinion, does not extend to the pro-
tection of harms inflicted by private actors in other settings. 15 6 Note,
however, that the Court refused to address whether the state es-
tablishes a duty to protect a child where, "by the affirmative exercise
of its power," the state places the child in a foster home operated
by its agents. 157 The majority deliberately left this door open, stating
that, under such circumstances, "we might have a situation suffi-
ciently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise
to an affirmative duty to protect.' 1 58
Chief Justice Rehnquist ultimately refused to apply the "Estelle-
Youngberg" analysis to the present facts. 5 9 The Chief Justice noted
that Joshua was not in the custody of the state when his injuries
were inflicted, and, while the state might have known that he was
in danger, it played no part in creating or aggravating this danger. 160
Even though the state had once taken custody of Joshua, the ma-
jority held that no affirmative duty was created because "the State
does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety
by having once offered him shelter.' ' 16'
Although the Court denied the plaintiffs' plea for a constitutional
remedy, it did recognize that the state might have acquired a duty
to protect Joshua under state tort law. 62 In addition, the majority
noted that a state may impose affirmative duties of care and pro-
tection upon its agents through its own courts or legislature. 63
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist, after acknowledging the
sympathetic nature of the situation, reminded those who would re-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1006 n.9.
158. Id. at 1006.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965), which provides that:
[O]ne who undertakes ... to provide services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform
the undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm, or (b)
the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance on the undertaking.
163. Id.
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quire the state to compensate Joshua for his injuries that the harm
was inflicted by his father and not by the state.' Under these cir-
cumstances, the Constitution does not guarantee an affirmative duty
to protect. Therefore, a section 1983 claim based on a violation of
due process rights through state inaction must fail as a matter of
law. 165
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Black-
mun, dissented, stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist's irrelevant
proclamation that the Constitution contains no general guarantees
of positive liberties make the majority "unable to appreciate [the
Court's] recognition in Estelle and Youngberg that this principle
does not hold true in all circumstances. ' 166 According to Justice
Brennan, the Court should have initially focused on the acts that
the state had already taken with respect to Joshua.167 By focusing
on the state's prior actions, the Court can then more readily assess
the constitutional significance of the state's subsequent inaction.'68
Justice Brennan believes that state knowledge of an individual's plight
combined with expressions of intent to assist him can result in a
"limitation of his freedom to act on his own behalf.' 69 Therefore,
Justice Brennan, unlike the majority, would interpret Estelle and
Youngberg as standing for the "much more generous proposition"
that a state, by cutting off private sources of aid and subsequently
refusing to offer assistance, cannot "wash its hands" of the con-
sequences of its failure to act." 70
Justice Blackmun, in addition to joining Justice Brennan's dis-
sent, filed his own opinion, focusing more on the principles of nat-
ural law than on the majority's sterile formalism.' 7' He disagreed
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J,, dissenting).
167. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
168. See id.
169. Id, at 1009 (quoting DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006).
170. Id.
171. See Id. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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with the Chief Justice's attempt to treat the issue of action and
inaction in black and white terms.' 72 To Jistice Blackmun, a proper
reading of fourteenth amendment precedent does not ignore the
"dictates of fundamental justice," and recognizes that compassion
does not have to be removed from judicial decision-making. 73
D. Practical Concerns
Opponents of an affirmative state duty to protect abused children
fear that this obligation could conceivably expand to require affir-
mative police, fire and medical services. 74 They fear that a trend
toward broad affirmative state duties "might lead to inappropriate
federal interference in the inner workings of state agencies, a chilling
effect on state assistance efforts to its citizens, and the eventual
finding of a state duty to the public at large.' 7 5
The Court could have avoided this problem without finding that
the state had no duty to protect Joshua DeShaney. Rather than
limiting the threshold finding of state action to a present deprivation
of the individual's liberty, the Court could have based this finding
on both a present and a past deprivation of liberty affecting the
individual's present ability to protect himself. 76 Therefore, because
Joshua DeShaney had previously been in state custody, he could
have come within the scope of the state protection requirement (as-
suming that the Court would have accepted the argument that the
past state action diminished Joshua's later ability to protect himself)
without paving the way for a potentially harmful expansion of the
duty to protect in the lower courts.
IV. STATE INACTION SUITS AFTER DESHANEY
Joshua DeShaney will never know it, unfortunately, but he has had a dramatic
impact on constitutional law. The case that grew out of his tragedy - decided
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1012-13. "Poor Joshua! ... It is a sad commentary upon American life, and
constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about 'liberty
and justice for all,' that this child ... now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly
retarded." Id.
174. See Winchenback, Snake Pits and Slippery Slopes: DeShaney Revisited, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1989, at 65.
175. Id.
176. See id.
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last February by the Supreme Court - is already affecting law suits across the
country.'77
A. The Effects of DeShaney
With DeShaney, the Supreme Court severely limited the range
of circumstances requiring affirmative state action as a constitutional
right. The Court blocked the expansion of the right to safety beyond
those situations where the state action has involuntarily deprived an
individual's liberty, and, in doing so, rejected the creation of a duty
to act through "special relationships" between the state and mem-
bers of the general public.
This holding removed most of the prior confusion concerning
the extent to which the fourteenth amendment requires affirmative
state action. The Fourth Circuit, in Milburn v. Anne Arundel County
Dep't of Social Services,'78 illustrated this result. In Milburn, a for-
mer foster child brought a section 1983 action against a variety of
state actors for failing to report child abuse inflicted by his foster
parents. As in DeShaney, the state knew of Charles Milburn's in-
juries and suspected that his foster parents were abusing him, yet
the state did nothing. While the Fourth Circuit had recognized the
"special relationship" doctrine and had previously expressed a desire
to apply its "special relationship" analysis to an appropriate set of
facts, 79 the court, with no hesitation, followed DeShaney, thereby
abandoning Jensen's "special relationship" factors analysis. 80
Although DeShaney did not reach the issue of whether an af-
firmative duty to act arises out of an involuntary placement of a
child in a foster home, the Fourth Circuit did not address this issue
because the child in Milburn was voluntarily placed in the foster
177. Doe v. Milwaukee County, 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1370 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
178. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989).
179. See Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194-95 n.II (4th Cir. 1984) (dicta) (articulating factors
that should be included in a "special relationship" analysis).
180. See Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476-79. The facts of DeShaney and Milburn were "indistinguish-
able," except that the abuse was inflicted by a natural parent in the former case, as opposed to a
foster parent in the latter. On this issue, the court concluded that foster parents, like natural parents,
are not state actors, thereby absolving the state from direct responsibility for the foster parents' actions.
Id. at 476.
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home by his natural parents.' 8' Here, unlike the scenario discussed
in DeShaney, the state had not restrained the plaintiff's liberty by
an affirmative exercise of its power. Therefore, according to the
Supreme Court's rigid holding, the state's actions could not have
created a duty to act. 182
Also strictly following the DeShaney holding, the Third Circuit,
in Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc.
v. City of Philadelphia,'81 recognized that DeShaney overruled its
decision in Estate of Bailey v. County of York. 8 4 In Philadelphia
Police & Fire, a mentally retarded person living at home challenged
the constitutionality of cuts in habilitative services provided by the
city." 5 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in a decision rendered prior to DeShaney, relied on
the "special relationship" doctrine and the right to safety in holding
that the cutbacks violated the plaintiffs' substantive due process
rights. 116 In light of DeShaney, the court of appeals reversed the
lower court's ruling because the plaintiffs were not within the narrow
range of individuals entitled to affirmative state action as a right. 8 7
In at least one decision, however, a federal district court em-
ployed the DeShaney holding to support a section 1983 suit based
on state inaction. In Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools,'8 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
refused to dismiss a complaint which alleged that the state knew
that a young public school student had been physically and verbally
abused by other students, that it expressed a desire to prevent such
attacks in the future, and that the state subsequently failed to protect
the abused student.' 89 The court believed that the present facts more
181. Id. at 476.
182. Id.
183. 874 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1989).
184. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that state knowledge of an individual's plight could
lead to the creation of a "special relationship").
185. 874 F.2d at 157.
186. Id. at 166.
187. Id. at 166-69.
188. 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
189. Id.
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closely resembled Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services90
than DeShaney, "since both the victim and the perpetrators were
under the care of the school in its parens patriae capacity at the
time these alleged incidents occurred."' 19 Given state truancy laws
requiring elementary school students to attend school, the court de-
cided that these students should be entitled to "some duty of care."' 92
B. The Future
Although DeShaney unified the federal courts on most of the
constitutional issues relating to state inaction, this area of law is far
from being settled. Not only has the Supreme Court expressly per-
mitted the states to impose an affirmative state duty to protect
through the principles of tort law, but the Court, by declining to
address the existence of a duty to protect in the foster care setting,
has also left open a potential means of constitutional expansion. As
seen above in Pagano, the federal courts, employing a little creative
reasoning, might begin to "fit" various fact patterns, by analogy,
into this apparently narrow exception. Over time, the holdings pro-
duced by the various federal circuits could equal or surpass the un-
certainty witnessed by the Supreme Court prior to DeShaney.
For example, in time, a federal court could even apply the
DeShaney exception to facts similar to those presented by DeShaney
itself. Because situations "sufficiently analogous" to involuntary
confinement might create an affirmative duty to protect, a court
could reason that the state, by affirmatively protecting parental au-
tonomy through judicial decisions and legislative enactments, ef-
fectively prevents an abused child from escaping the custody of his
parents and entering "free society."' 93 State law supports the par-
ents' custody rights, thereby restricting the abused child's freedom
to act on his own behalf. DeShaney stated that the duty to protect
arises from this type of limitation. 94 Therefore, under this analysis,
190. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a duty to protect exists in the foster home
situation).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9.
194. See id. at 1005-06.
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the scope of the DeShaney exception might include these circum-
stances of child abuse giving rise to an affirmative state duty to
protect.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to DeShaney, a variety of constitutional doctrines relating
to state inaction developed in the federal court system. 95 It was not
clear if or when the state's failure to act constituted a deprivation
of an individual's due process rights. Furthermore, the issue of state
inaction in the context of child abuse inflicted by natural parents
represented practically unchartered constitutional waters.
The Supreme Court, with its decision in DeShaney, both refused
to extend the duty to protect abused children and significantly nar-
rowed the scope of affirmative state action requirements.1 96 How-
ever, the Court refused to decide whether an involuntarily placed
foster child has an affirmative right to safety in the foster home.' 97
As evidenced by at least one decision since DeShaney, this ex-
ception could pave the way for future constitutional expansions by
the federal courts.'9 If a set of facts relating to child abuse creates
a sufficient analogy to institutionalization or imprisonment, the state
duty to protect could arise.
Michael J. Florio
195. See supra notes 19-116 and accompanying text.
196, See supra notes 146-65 and accompanying text,
197. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
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